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ABSTRACT—The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA) requires prisons to make accommodations to regulations that 
substantially burden a prisoner’s religious exercise, unless the prison can 
show that the regulation is the least restrictive means to meeting a 
compelling interest. This language suggests strict scrutiny, and yet in 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court instead intimated in dicta that 
courts should give prison officials “due deference” when applying this test. 
The 2015 case of Holt v. Hobbs presented the Court with an opportunity to 
clarify how much deference is due under RLUIPA. Though Holt declared 
that there should not be “unquestioning” deference toward prison officials, 
the decision failed to mention Cutter or draw clear lines. Questions about 
the viability of Cutter’s due deference standard thus persist. This Note 
provides the first comprehensive analysis of the application of RLUIPA 
post-Holt by presenting a qualitative and quantitative analysis of all lower 
court cases addressing RLUIPA accommodations from 2015 to 2017. This 
analysis shows that, while some confusion remains, the lower courts are 
moving towards a hard look analysis rather than deference. At the same 
time, this Note argues that Cutter was not overruled and that Holt in fact 
clarified Cutter to provide guidelines for the appropriate amount of scrutiny 
to be applied in a penal context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are Billy Soza Warsoldier, a Cahuilla Native American. 
Your religious faith teaches that hair length symbolizes wisdom and 
requires that hair can only be shorn upon the death of a relative. You 
sincerely believe that cutting your hair will cost you knowledge and render 
you unable to join your ancestors in the afterlife. In fact, your hair has not 
been cut for over thirty years. Now, imagine that you are incarcerated, and 
the prison requires all prisoners’ hair to be cut short because long hair 
could be used to hide contraband.1 Can the prison require you to violate the 
tenets of your religion by cutting your hair? 
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA)2 
provides that the government may not substantially burden a prisoner’s 
religious exercise unless the burden is “in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest” and is “the least restrictive means of furthering that 
interest.”3 Therefore, if the prison failed to allow you an accommodation, 
you could challenge that decision in court.4 But the location of the prison 
greatly impacts your chances of success. If the prison is located in the 
Ninth Circuit, which has closely examined prison policies to determine if 
they survive RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny test,5 then it is more likely that a 
 
 1 This factual scenario is from Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012). 
 3 Id. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2). 
 4 Id. § 2000cc-2(a) (“A person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a 
judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”). 
 5 See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
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court would find RLUIPA requires an accommodation for your long hair. If 
the prison is located within the Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, you may be 
more likely to lose your claim because that particular circuit has afforded 
significant deference to prison officials’ assertions that a given policy is the 
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.6 
This confusion in the lower courts stems from the Supreme Court’s 
contradictory instructions regarding the deference due to prison officials’ 
determination under RLUIPA. The Court first addressed the 
constitutionality of RLUIPA in Cutter v. Wilkinson.7 While holding the 
statute constitutional,8 the Court noted that lower courts should apply “due 
deference” to prison officials’ determinations of compelling interest and 
least restrictive means,9 even though these two terms are traditionally 
understood to mean that strict scrutiny applies.10 This contradiction led 
some courts to be deferential to prison officials’ determinations in applying 
the compelling interest and least restrictive means test.11 Other courts, 
however, consequently took a “hard look” approach, which is closer to true 
 
 6 See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 7 544 U.S. 709, 712–13 (2005). 
 8 Id. at 725–26. 
 9 Id. at 722–23, 725 n.13. Strict scrutiny, in contrast to “due deference,” is a test so stringent some 
define it as “strict in theory, fatal in fact.” See Marci Hamilton, The Supreme Court’s New Ruling on the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act’s Prison Provisions: Deferring Key 
Constitutional Questions, FINDLAW (June 2, 2005), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/the-
supreme-courts-new-ruling-on-the-religious-land-use-and-institutionalized-persons-acts-prison-
provisions-deferring-key-constitutional-questions.html [https://perma.cc/TK96-U4GM] (noting that 
strict scrutiny traditionally places a “very heavy burden” on those defending a contested law, and that 
the Supreme Court has explained strict scrutiny to mean that a law is “presumptively unconstitutional”). 
 10 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1321–34 (2007) 
(noting the three “elements of strict scrutiny”: “(1) identifying the . . . fundamental rights the 
infringement of which triggers strict scrutiny; (2) determining which governmental interests count as 
compelling; and (3) giving content to the requirement of narrow tailoring” (i.e., the Court’s “least 
restrictive alternative” demand (footnote omitted))). 
 11 For examples of courts applying a deferential standard, see AlAmiin v. Morton, 528 F. App’x 
838, 843–44 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished decision) (holding that a policy preventing a Muslim 
prisoner from using religious oils did not violate the RLUIPA); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1277–80 
(11th Cir. 2011) (holding that an Odinist prisoner did not meet his burden of showing that a prison’s 
denial of his request for a quartz crystal, a worship space, and a small fire constituted a “substantial 
burden” on the practice of his religion), abrogated by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011); Fowler 
v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 942–43 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that security concerns took priority over a 
prisoner’s interest in having a sweat lodge to practice his Native American faith); Baranowski v. Hart, 
486 F.3d 112, 125 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a prison administration’s interest in “maintaining good 
order and controlling costs” took priority over a Jewish prisoner’s request to observe the Sabbath and 
eat kosher meals); and Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 422 F.3d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that the 
district court wrongly failed to give deference to the prison administration when the lower court granted 
injunctive relief to a prisoner who refused to cut his hair due to religious beliefs). 
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strict scrutiny, when analyzing prison policies under RLUIPA.12 Post-
Cutter, therefore, a prisoner might not get an accommodation to which she 
is statutorily entitled and may be forced to violate sincerely held religious 
beliefs at the behest of the government, simply due to an accident of 
geography. 
In 2015, the Court considered RLUIPA again in Holt v. Hobbs to 
determine whether a no-facial-hair policy violated the rights of a Muslim 
prisoner who wished to grow a half-inch beard pursuant to his faith.13 
Though this presented an opportunity to clarify whether courts should 
apply strict scrutiny or be deferential to prison officials’ claims, the Court 
failed to discuss Cutter’s deference instruction at all and instead only noted 
that “unquestioning deference” is not permitted.14 Because Holt did not 
explicitly overrule Cutter, the Supreme Court has endorsed two seemingly 
contradictory standards. In Cutter, the Court asked for deference to be 
given to prison officials, but in Holt, the Court hewed closer to strict 
scrutiny and noted only that courts should not give officials “unquestioning 
deference.” 
This Note provides the first comprehensive analysis of Holt’s 
application by the lower courts since the case was decided. A quantitative 
examination of each RLUIPA decision citing Holt and Cutter in this period 
shows that lower courts have generally heeded Holt’s instruction to 
undertake a more fact-specific inquiry once it determines a prisoner’s 
religious exercise has been substantially burdened (a seemingly higher bar 
post-Holt). Cutter deference, however, has not completely been repudiated, 
and some confusion remains in the lower courts. This Note suggests that 
courts can reconcile Cutter, Holt, and RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny language 
by asking prison officials to offer proof to the court that their policy was 
 
 12 For examples of courts applying a hard look standard, see Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 800–01 
(7th Cir. 2008) (finding that efficient food services was not a compelling state interest and that the 
prison’s policy of requiring “clergy verification” of a prisoner’s religious food requirements was not the 
least restrictive means of achieving the result); Spratt v. R.I. Dep’t of Corr., 482 F.3d 33, 39, 41 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (finding that the defendant prison had failed to show both that banning a prisoner from 
preaching served the prison’s interest in security and that no alternative policy could have achieved this 
end); Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 283, 285 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the mere assertion of a 
security interest is not sufficient to meet the compelling interest requirement and that the defendant 
prison failed to show that limiting prisoners to ten books was the least restrictive means of ensuring the 
security of prisoners’ storage boxes); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 190–91 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that the defendant prison had failed to articulate a compelling interest in limiting participation in 
Ramadan activities to prisoners who had not broken the Ramadan fast and that there were less 
restrictive means available even if this had been a compelling interest); and Warsoldier v. Woodford, 
418 F.3d 989, 1001 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that a prison grooming policy regarding male prisoners’ 
hair length was not the least restrictive means of achieving safety and security). 
 13 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015). 
 14 Id. at 864. 
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the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest rather than 
simply asserting that that is the case. 
Part I of this Note describes the development of free exercise law and 
RLUIPA, as well as the general arguments advanced by prisoners and 
prison officials in RLUIPA cases. Next, Part II discusses Cutter, the 
intervening circuit split, and Holt. Part III then presents the results of the 
quantitative analysis of the lower courts’ treatment of Holt and Cutter since 
Holt, finds that lower courts are applying a more stringent standard, and 
suggests that Cutter and Holt are reconcilable. Lastly, this Note concludes 
by proposing that Holt has moved RLUIPA away from “strict in theory, 
deferential in fact” and towards “strict in theory, strict in fact.” 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS FREE EXERCISE PROTECTIONS 
The religious freedom protections of the U.S. Constitution’s Free 
Exercise Clause have oscillated over time, both generally and in the penal 
context. This Part briefly discusses the Court’s relevant free exercise 
jurisprudence and then outlines Congress’s statutory extension of broader 
religious protection through RLUIPA and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA). This Section concludes by discussing the penal 
context, with a focus on the burdens placed on prisoners’ free exercise and 
prison officials’ arguments concerning the compelling interest served by 
the restrictive regulations. 
A. Scrutiny of First Amendment Free Exercise Claims 
The First Amendment requires that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”15 As the Supreme Court noted, 
“[t]he place of religion in our society is an exalted one.”16 However, 
religious freedom is not without limits, and the Court has rejected free 
exercise challenges where “[t]he conduct or actions so regulated have 
invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order.”17 
In fact, until 1963, a religious exemption to a generally applicable law was 
required only if Congress or a state legislature provided for the 
exemption.18 
 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 16 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). 
 17 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). For example, in an earlier case the Court noted 
that governmental limitations on religious exercise were permitted to require vaccination of a disease 
due to health concerns. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“The right to 
practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable 
disease or the latter to ill health or death.”). 
 18 Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1473 
(1999). 
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In Sherbert v. Verner,19 the Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny 
applied to a law that substantially burdened a sincere religious objector’s 
exercise of religion and that the objector would be entitled to a religious 
exemption from the law if the law could not survive strict scrutiny.20 
Because strict scrutiny is generally “strict in theory, fatal in fact,” this 
ruling presented a significant curtailment of the state’s ability to impose on 
the practice of one’s faith.21 The Court subsequently weakened the force of 
Sherbert, however, by holding in Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources v. Smith that religious exemptions from generally 
applicable laws are not “constitutionally required,” and that groups seeking 
exemptions from such laws should turn to the political process instead.22 
The Court’s decision in Smith effectively reverted back to the pre-Sherbert 
rule: an exemption to a generally applicable law was required only if the 
legislature provided for it.23 
The development of First Amendment protections followed a similar 
path in the penal context, in which incarceration circumscribes a prisoner’s 
rights.24 Still, the Court provided greater protections for prisoners’ free 
exercise of religion in the 1960s and 1970s.25 These protections reached 
their height in Cruz v. Beto,26 which held that a prison must afford prisoners 
“reasonable opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable to the 
opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious 
precepts.”27 Fifteen years later in Turner v. Safley,28 however, the Court 
held that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional 
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate 
 
 19 374 U.S. 398. 
 20 Id. at 403–04. 
 21 James D. Nelson, Note, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny, 95 VA. L. REV. 
2053, 2057 (2009) (“[Sherbert] seemed to offer religious citizens a powerful tool to resist state 
impositions on the practice of their faith.”). 
 22 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 23 Dawinder S. Sidhu, Religious Freedom and Inmate Grooming Standards, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
923, 932 (2012). 
 24 See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (“The fact of 
confinement and the needs of the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional rights, including 
those derived from the First Amendment, which are implicit in incarceration.”). 
 25 Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s 
Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 507 (2005). 
 26 405 U.S. 319 (1972); see also Gaubatz, supra note 25, at 507 (“In the 15 years following Cruz v. 
Beto, prisoners enjoyed the highest level of protection for their First Amendment religious exercise 
rights in the nation’s history.”). 
 27 405 U.S. at 322. 
 28 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
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penological interests.”29 Thus, “[w]hile Smith directed courts to defer to 
legislative judgments, Turner left those delicate policy decisions largely to 
prison officials.”30 Prisoners were left with little chance for an exemption 
from a regulation that violated their religious expression because prison 
officials merely needed to point to a related penological interest to survive 
judicial review. 
B. Statutory Responses to Smith and Turner 
Following Turner, the people did turn to the political process. In 1993, 
Congress enacted RFRA to reapply Sherbert’s strict scrutiny test to all 
governmental burdens on free exercise, including in the penal context.31 
Under RFRA, a law could substantially burden an individual’s free exercise 
of religion only if the government demonstrated that the burden (1) “is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and (2) “is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”32 
While RFRA’s strict scrutiny test extended to regulations that 
burdened a prisoner’s free exercise, in practice, courts often deferred to 
prison officials’ determinations.33 Courts either transformed the strict 
scrutiny test into a reasonableness test through their analysis of “least 
restrictive means”34 or found that there was no substantial burden by 
focusing on whether the practice was religiously mandated or central to the 
 
 29 Id. at 89. To determine reasonableness, the Court suggested courts consider the following 
factors: (1) the “‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate 
governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising 
the right that remain open to prison inmates”; (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted 
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources 
generally”; and (4) “ready alternatives” to the regulation. Id. at 89–90 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 
468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). 
 30 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2059 (citing Daniel J. Solove, Note, Faith Profaned: The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459, 470 (1996)). Turner and its 
application in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), signaled the Court’s broader dilution 
of religious liberty protections. See id. at 2059. Moving beyond the penal context, the Court applied the 
lax rational basis test to all laws of general applicability in Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
 31 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4. (2012); see also Taylor G. Stout, Note, The Costs of Religious 
Accommodation in Prisons, 96 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2010). 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 33 Case Comment, Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act — Religious Liberty — Holt v. 
Hobbs, 129 HARV. L. REV. 351, 357 (2015) [hereinafter Holt Comment] (“[M]any courts applied the 
[strict scrutiny] test with a gloss that resulted in doctrinal confusion regarding the amount of deference, 
if any, due to prison officials.”). 
 34 See Gaubatz, supra note 25, at 550–51; Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L.J. 575, 596 (1998). 
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belief.35 Courts also deferred to prison officials’ claims that restrictive 
policies were necessary to effect safety.36 This practice meant that 
exemptions or other relief was rare, with less than 10% of prisoner claims 
granted relief.37 
Then, in the 1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores,38 the Court found 
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states because it exceeded 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause authority.39 Thus, 
the provisions of RFRA no longer applied to state laws and regulations, 
including those made by state and local penitentiaries. In a penal context, 
RFRA now applies only to the federal penitentiary system. Following City 
of Boerne, some states adopted their own versions of the RFRA.40 Many 
states did not, however, and laws that infringed upon an individual’s 
religious exercise were subject only to the rational basis test put forth in 
Turner and Smith.41 
In 2000, Congress responded to City of Boerne by passing RLUIPA.42 
In a departure from Congress’s trend of circumscribing prisoners’ rights,43 
RLUIPA reinstated strict scrutiny for limits on prisoners’ free exercise. It 
provided that the government “shall [not] impose a substantial burden on 
the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 
institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability,” unless the substantial burden furthers a compelling 
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so.44 
RLUIPA defined religious exercise broadly as “any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”45 
This statutory change removed a barrier that had existed under RFRA: 
 
 35 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2109–10 (“Use of the centrality and compulsion tests also worked 
repeatedly to the disadvantage of incarcerated claimants. Most prisoner cases involve claims by 
members of nontraditional religions.” (footnote omitted)). 
 36 See Gaubatz, supra note 25, at 551 n.225. 
 37 Lupu, supra note 34, at 591. 
 38 521 U.S. 507 (1997) 
 39 Id. at 536. 
 40 See Sidhu, supra note 23, at 932–33, for identification of states and types of provisions. 
 41 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2058–59. 
 42 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012). To avoid the constitutional infirmity that plagued RFRA, 
see supra note 39 and accompanying text, Congress enacted RLUIPA under the spending and 
commerce powers, see Sidhu, supra note 23, at 933. 
 43 Gaubatz, supra note 25, at 504–05 (noting the barriers to prisoners imposed by the Court in 
Turner and by Congress in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which created restrictive filing 
requirements, intended to eliminate frivolous prisoner lawsuits). 
 44 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. This provision is essentially identical to RFRA’s provision. See supra 
note 32 and accompanying text. 
 45 Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). The Court has held, however, that this belief must be “sincer[e].” Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005). 
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courts under RFRA had been permitted to ignore the personal and 
individual nature of religious beliefs and practices when considering the 
centrality of a practice.46 For example, in Hunter v. Baldwin,47 decided 
under RFRA, the Ninth Circuit held that withholding an arguably 
inflammatory religious pamphlet did not violate the inmate’s free exercise 
because possessing the pamphlet was not mandated by his faith.48 Under 
RLUIPA, a court could not consider whether possessing the pamphlet was 
in fact required. 
A plaintiff bringing a RLUIPA claim bears the initial burden of 
proving that the regulation “substantial[ly] burden[ed]” his exercise of 
religion.49 The Act did not define “substantial burden,” leaving it to judicial 
interpretation.50 Although there was some inconsistency in defining 
substantial burden pre-Holt,51 Holt clarified this test by requiring an 
individualized assessment of the plaintiff’s subjective sincerity and a 
determination of whether the prisoner must actually choose between 
following religious belief or following prison policy.52 Once the plaintiff 
meets his burden of proof, the burden shifts to the government to prove the 
regulation is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state 
interest.53 
The level of deference courts should pay to prison officials when 
determining the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest is 
not entirely clear from the text of RLUIPA. The Act’s sponsors, Senators 
Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy, noted that strict scrutiny should be applied 
with “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail 
administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to 
maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration 
of costs and limited resources.”54 This statement appears inconsistent with 
the principal aim of RLUIPA, which was to strengthen the deferential First 
 
 46 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2110. Nelson suggested that this statutory change “may account for at 
least part of the increased success of prisoner claims” under RLUIPA. Id. 
 47 No. 95-35330, 1996 WL 95046 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996). 
 48 Id. at *1. For additional discussion and examples of centrality determinations under the RFRA, 
see Solove, supra note 30, at 475–80. 
 49 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(2), § 2000cc-1. 
 50 See 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch & Kennedy) 
(noting that “‘substantial burden’ . . . . should be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence” as to the “concept of substantial burden or religious exercise”). 
 51 See infra notes 105–106, 128–130 and accompanying text; see also Gaubatz, supra note 25, at 
516 n.65 (detailing inconsistent lower court determinations of substantial burden). 
 52 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). 
 53 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(2), 2000cc-1. 
 54 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch & Kennedy). 
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Amendment standard established in Turner.55 Such inconsistencies in 
RLUIPA’s legislative history may explain some of the difficulties courts 
have faced in considering prison officials’ explanations while applying the 
Act’s (supposed) strict scrutiny test.56 Thus, while RLUIPA has provided 
an avenue for relief for prisoners demanding religious exemptions from 
prison policies,57 the results of these suits have varied due to confusion as to 
the level of deference that should be afforded to prison officials.58 
C. Religious Freedom in Prisons 
Prison regulations often burden a prisoner’s free exercise of religion, 
and prisoners have challenged these regulations in the courts. Challenges 
under RLUIPA fall into three main categories.59 First, prisoners from a 
variety of religious faiths have challenged grooming regulations that 
prevent them from growing their hair or beard or from wearing religious 
head coverings or clothing.60 Second, prisoners have challenged prison 
regulations that prohibit certain types of religious ceremonies or services.61 
Finally, prisoners have challenged policies that restrict access to religious 
materials, including food types.62 
 
 55 Morgan F. Johnson, Comment, Heaven Help Us: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act’s Prisoners Provisions in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 585, 598 (2006). 
 56 See infra Part II. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Court cited the Hatch–Kennedy statement while 
noting in dicta that “due deference” should be accorded to determinations by prison officials because 
“context matters.” 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005). 
 57 See Sidhu, supra note 23, at 934 (“Given its stricter standard, and Smith’s alleged ‘emasculation’ 
of free exercise, RLUIPA is, understandably, the preferred avenue for relief for inmates demanding 
religious exemptions to or contesting the validity of state prison grooming policies.” (footnote 
omitted)). In fact, RLUIPA led to a marked increase of inmate suits. See Nelson, supra note 21, at 2054 
(noting that in 2008, “federal courts heard well over one hundred RLUIPA prisoner claims, including 
over a dozen appeals”). 
 58 See infra Part II. The Court had the opportunity to consider this issue in Holt, and Part III of this 
Note, infra, considers whether the Court was sufficiently clear in its instruction. 
 59 See Gaubatz, supra note 25, at 557 (outlining “four general categories” of RLUIPA claims, two 
of which—restrictions on diet and restrictions on access to religious items—I have grouped into one 
category). 
 60 Id. at 560; see, e.g., Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1095–96 (E.D. Cal. 2004) 
(ruling in favor of Muslim prisoners who desired to wear beards); Toles v. Young, No. 7:00-CV-210, 
2002 WL 32591568, at *9 (W.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2002) (requiring Jewish prisoner to cut hair and beard). 
 61 Gaubatz, supra note 25, at 562–66. For example, in Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 
2008), a Native American petitioner challenged a prison’s refusal to accommodate his request for 
material such as rocks and shovels to be used to create a sweat lodge. Id. at 942. 
 62 Gaubatz, supra note 25, at 558–59, 566–68. For example, in Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 
566, 569 n.2 (W.D. Va. 2003), the court held that a prison’s denial of a kosher diet to a Jew did not 
survive strict scrutiny. In Patel v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2008), 
the Eighth Circuit held that the petitioner was not substantially burdened by the prison’s failure to 
provide a halal meal outside of the regular vegetarian meal because it was only inconvenient for the 
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In response to prisoners’ RLUIPA claims, prison officials offer two 
common reasons for these restrictions. First, they generally assert that 
prison security is a compelling interest served by the burdening regulation. 
Regulations can protect security interests by permitting the quick 
identification of prisoners, preventing prisoners from obtaining and hiding 
dangerous items, safeguarding officer safety, impeding the facilitation of 
gang activity, and eliminating perceptions of favoritism that might bread 
jealousy and hostility.63 In Holt, for example, the prison justified its no-
facial-hair policy because it allowed for quick identification of prisoners64 
and it prevented prisoners from hiding contraband in their beards.65 Prison 
officials have also argued that grooming policies protect guards from a 
potential attack that could happen while searching a prisoner’s hair for 
contraband.66 Prison officials further assert that religious exemptions from 
uniform and grooming policies allow for gangs to co-opt religion for gang 
identification.67 
Second, prisons also assert that general regulations serve a compelling 
interest by mitigating financial and administrative costs associated with 
making exceptions.68 For example, in Baranowski v. Hart, the prison 
claimed that its budget would not permit the provision of kosher meals 
 
petitioner to buy a low-cost halal meal from the prison commissary. In the case of non-diet-related 
religious materials, courts seem to be even more apt to find the burdens to be merely inconvenient. See 
Gaubatz, supra note 25, at 567. 
 63 Stout, supra note 31, at 1209–14. 
 64 135 S. Ct. 853, 864 (2015) (“The Department tells us that the no-beard policy allows security 
officers to identify prisoners quickly and accurately.”); see also Hans Toch & James R. Acker, Invoking 
Ineffable Experience: The Aborted Argument for Curbing Religious Accommodation in Arkansas 
Prisons, 52 CRIM. L. BULL. 434 (2016) (discussing the deficiencies of the state’s arguments in Holt). In 
Holt, the State argued that beards could “make inmates ‘resemble other inmates’ who also have beards, 
giving rise to impersonations and the possibility that an inmate will use another inmate’s identification 
card ‘to get into areas of the prison where they [sic] do not belong.’” Toch and Acker, supra (quoting 
Brief for Respondents at 47–48, Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (No. 13-6827)). Further, a “long-
haired inmate might easily change his appearance by cutting his hair.” Stout, supra note 31, at 1213 
(citing Appellees’ Brief at 17, Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-55879)). 
 65 Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863 (“The Department worries that prisoners may use their beards to conceal 
all manner of prohibited items, including razors, needles, drugs, and cellular phone subscriber identity 
module (SIM) cards.”); Stout, supra note 31, at 1212–13 (discussing the argument that prisoners could 
hide contraband in facial hair) (citing Appellees’ Brief, supra note 64 at 16–17). 
 66 Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864 (“The Department suggests that requiring guards to search a prisoner’s 
beard would pose a risk to the physical safety of a guard if a razor or needle was concealed in the 
beard.”); see also Stout, supra note 31, at 1213 (discussing the argument that a corrections officer 
searching a prisoner’s beard would be brought in close physical proximity to the prisoner and thus be at 
greater risk) (citing Appellees’ Brief, supra note 64, at 16–17). 
 67 Stout, supra note 31, at 1210 (“[W]here previously prison officials successfully prevented gangs 
from wearing colors or emblems, these same groups [of prisoners] now assert the right to wear special 
clothing or medallions as expressions of religious freedom.”). 
 68 Id. at 1214–17. 
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because that required separate kitchens.69 Administratively, prison officials 
argue that they have to devote staff to implementing the large number and 
variety of accommodations that the statute might require.70 Furthermore, 
because some courts compare prison policies with those of other similar 
prisons when undertaking a less deferential form of scrutiny, officials point 
to the burden placed on them to compare contested policies with those at 
other prisons and reconcile inconsistencies.71 
 
*          *           * 
 
In sum, although the Court found that, as a matter of constitutional 
analysis, a prisoner “regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests,”72 Congress responded by passing 
legislation calling for a higher level of scrutiny. RLUIPA permits only 
regulations that use the least restrictive means to further a compelling 
governmental interest.73 Common regulations challenged include grooming 
regulations, regulations prohibiting certain religious ceremonies, and 
regulations restricting access to religious materials.74 Prison officials 
typically assert these regulations are justified by security needs or financial 
and administrative costs.75 Courts, however, have not consistently 
determined how much deference is due toward the assertions of prison 
officials when litigating RLUIPA claims. 
II. STANDARDS OF DEFERENCE: CUTTER AND HOLT 
Since the enactment of RLUIPA, courts have grappled with how much 
deference to give prison officials when determining if a regulation is the 
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest. The Supreme 
 
 69 486 F.3d 112, 125–26 (5th Cir. 2007). The Baranowski Court, applying a deferential analysis, 
accepted the prison’s argument that budget would not allow a separate kitchen to be maintained or food 
to be brought in from outside. Id. 
 70 Stout, supra note 31, at 1214–15. In particular, prison officials note the effect of the expansive 
definition of religious exercise in RLUIPA, which not only increases the number of accommodations 
but also makes the process more complex by possibly “requir[ing] prisons to tailor policies to particular 
prisoners.” Id. at 1215. 
 71 Id. at 1223. For a discussion of the hard look approach some courts have adopted, see infra 
Section II.B. In this respect, prison officials also point to the “significant time and resources” spent 
responding to RLUIPA litigation. See Stout, supra note 31, at 1227 (citing Protecting Religious 
Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 120–27 (1997) (testimony of Jeffrey Sutton, Solicitor for the State of Ohio)). 
 72 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
 73 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(2) (2012). 
 74 See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 75 See supra notes 63–71 and accompanying text. 
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Court has addressed this question twice—first in its 2005 Cutter v. 
Wilkinson decision76 and then again in its 2015 Holt v. Hobbs decision.77 In 
discussing the doctrine, this Part will do three things. First, it will outline 
the Court’s Cutter decision. Then, it will discuss the subsequent confusion 
in lower courts. Third, the Part concludes by discussing the Holt decision 
and its potential implications. 
A. Cutter v. Wilkinson—A Signal for Deference? 
The Court’s Cutter decision determined the constitutionality of 
RLUIPA by considering whether the institutionalized persons provision 
improperly advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.78 
The Court held that RLUIPA did not violate the Establishment Clause in 
part because the Act would be “administered neutrally among different 
faiths.”79 
The discussion of RLUIPA’s neutral applicability led to confusion 
regarding the level of deference courts should afford to prison officials’ 
explanations. The Court was convinced that RLUIPA would be evenly 
applied, as required by the Establishment Clause,80 because “[w]hile the 
Act adopt[ed] a ‘compelling governmental interest’ standard, ‘context 
matters’ in the application of that standard.”81 While examining the prison 
context, the Court noted that “[l]awmakers supporting RLUIPA were 
mindful of the urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal 
institutions,”82 and thus that lawmakers “anticipated that courts would apply 
the Act’s standard with ‘due deference to the experience and expertise of 
prison and jail administrators.’”83 Though the Court did not analyze 
 
 76 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 77 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
 78  544 U.S. at 712–13. Respondents argued that RLUIPA was unconstitutional because prisoners 
who “cloth[ed] their demands in religious garb” could get benefits generally unavailable in violation of 
the Establishment Clause. Brief for Respondents at 1–2, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (No. 
03-9877). The Establishment Clause contained within the First Amendment of the Constitution states 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), the 
Court established three factors a court should consider when determining whether a law impermissibly 
promoted religion: (1) whether the statute has a “secular legislative purpose,” (2) whether its “primary 
effect [is] one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) whether it “foster[s] an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.” 
 79 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720. The Court also noted that the purpose of RLUIPA was to “alleviate[] 
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise.” Id. 
 80 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 81 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722–23 (first quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012); then quoting Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)). 
 82 Id. at 723 (citing 139 CONG. REC. 26190 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Hatch)). 
 83 Id. (citing 146 CONG. REC. 16698–99 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch & Sen. Kennedy). 
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whether the prison’s failure to accommodate the prisoners’ religious 
exercise was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest, 
the Court declared that “prison security is a compelling state interest, 
and that deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area.”84 
The Court’s “due deference” instruction contradicts a principal aim of 
RLUIPA: the statute replaced the deferential standard established in Turner 
with a strict scrutiny test.85 In other contexts, strict scrutiny has been 
viewed as “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”86 However, in a penal context, 
Cutter appeared to signal that the standard was “strict in theory, deferential 
in fact.”87 The decision could be interpreted as requiring a test somewhere 
between a rational basis and an “absolute strict scrutiny” test.88 One 
explanation for this standard is that the Court wanted to follow its 
reasoning in earlier prisoners’ rights decisions such as Turner.89 On the 
other hand, the Court cited to Grutter v. Bollinger,90 a case brought under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.91 There, the 
Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether an affirmative 
action admissions policy was narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.92 
The Grutter citation may have signaled that strict scrutiny should be also 
 
 84 Id. at 725 n.13. The Court also noted that “prison officials [could] appropriately question 
whether a petitioner’s religiosity . . . is authentic” and whether a prisoner’s belief is “sincer[e].” Id. 
 85 See David M. Shapiro, To Seek a Newer World: Prisoners’ Rights at the Frontier, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 124, 126 (2016) (“Since strict scrutiny and deference are in a sense opposites, 
there was incoherence in the very notion of strict scrutiny with deference.”). 
 86 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (“Indeed, the failure of legislative action to 
survive strict scrutiny has led some to wonder whether our review of racial classifications has been 
strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”). 
 87 Hamilton, supra note 9. 
 88 Johnson, supra note 55, at 595. Taylor G. Stout suggested that the Cutter Court’s consideration 
of financial cost and administrative burden in its analysis signaled a retreat from absolute strict scrutiny. 
See Stout, supra note 31, at 1202–03. A discriminatory law or classification generally will survive 
rational basis review if it is “rationally related to a legitimate government interest.” City of New 
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). 
 89 See Johnson, supra note 55, at 596–97 (arguing that RLUIPA’s statutory test ignores the 
penological interests such as security and order that the Court recognized in Turner when developing a 
rational basis standard). In Turner, the Court noted that “[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of 
prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate 
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison 
administration.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361 
(1996) (“Turner’s principle of deference has special force with regard to that issue, since inmates in 
lockdown include the most dangerous and violent prisoners in the Arizona prison system and other 
inmates presenting special disciplinary and security concerns.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 90 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 91 The Equal Protection Clause reads: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 92 539 U.S. at 343 (finding that the affirmative action admissions policy was narrowly tailored and 
furthered the compelling interest of obtaining educational benefits that a diverse student body provides). 
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applied for RLUIPA accommodations.93 Cutter’s lack of clarity created 
confusion in the lower courts, leading to varying levels of deference being 
afforded to prison officials.94 
B. Post-Cutter Confusion in the Lower Courts 
After Cutter, a circuit split developed as courts struggled to determine 
whether they should offer deference to prison officials or if they should 
take a “harder look” at the explanations offered. The Ninth Circuit’s 
Warsoldier v. Woodford decision and the Sixth Circuit’s Hoevennar v. 
Lazaroff decision are illustrative, as both cases involved challenges to hair-
length restrictions and to prison officials’ testimony that the restrictions 
furthered a compelling security interest.95 In Warsoldier,96 the Ninth Circuit 
cited Cutter’s recognition that RLUIPA afforded greater protections to 
prisoners than the First Amendment and consequently did not defer to the 
prison officials.97 In particular, the court questioned the prison officials’ 
health and security rationale because female inmates did not have the same 
hair length restrictions as male inmates did.98 The Sixth Circuit in 
Hoevenaar,99 on the other hand, cited Cutter’s “due deference” language 
and did not challenge the prison officials’ judgments in holding that the 
hair-length policy did not infringe upon the prisoner’s RLUIPA rights.100 
Along with the Sixth Circuit, the Fifth,101 Eighth,102 Tenth,103 and 
Eleventh104 Circuits interpreted Cutter to allow deference towards prison 
 
 93 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2122–23 (“Only since the decision in Cutter have several courts 
explicitly imported concepts of strict scrutiny from equal protection and free speech contexts into 
accommodation, where previously such importation was almost unthinkable.”). 
 94 Holt Comment, supra note 33, at 358 (“The lack of specificity in Cutter opened the door to lower 
courts’ application of varying levels of deference to prison officials in RLUIPA cases between 2005 and 
2015.”). 
 95 See Nelson, supra note 21, at 2114–15 (identifying the Ninth and Sixth Circuits as the two most 
polarized circuits in interpreting RLUIPA). 
 96 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 97 Id. at 999–1000. The Ninth Circuit also noted that other prisons made exceptions to hair length 
policies without issue. Id. at 1001. 
 98 Id. at 1000. 
 99 422 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 100 Id. at 370–71. 
 101 See Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 125 (5th Cir. 2007) (deferring to prison officials’ 
submission that the prison budget was not adequate to cover the expense of “providing a separate 
kosher kitchen or bringing in kosher food from the outside” in holding a policy denying kosher food 
was permissible). 
 102 See Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 943 (8th Cir. 2008) (“JCCC officials have exercised 
their discretion and determined that a sweat lodge at JCCC jeopardizes prison safety and security to an 
unacceptable degree. This is precisely the exercise of discretion to which RLUIPA requires us to 
defer.”). 
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officials’ determinations when considering whether a regulation was the 
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest. This manifested 
in multiple ways. As an initial matter, deferential courts placed barriers to 
even considering the compelling interest test. For example, these courts 
generally focused on whether the regulation was coercive, an inquiry used 
in the older RFRA cases, rather than whether the regulation merely 
pressured the inmate to violate his beliefs, the proper inquiry under 
RLUIPA.105 Deferential courts also at times required the plaintiff to show 
that the entire regulatory system at a given prison was intolerant of a 
religion, rather than simply require the plaintiff to identify an individual 
burden.106 Finally, some deferential courts have considered the centrality of 
faith in the substantial burden analysis despite RLUIPA’s instruction that 
centrality of faith not be considered.107 
If these deferential courts reached the question of compelling interest 
and least restrictive means, they generally gave prison administrators 
significant latitude to justify the burdening policy.108 For example, some 
courts required only a “mere assertion of compelling interest,”109 a standard 
 
 103 See AlAmiin v. Morton, 528 F. App’x 838, 843–44 (10th Cir. 2013) (deferring to prison 
officials’ judgment that prayer oils diminished dogs’ ability to detect drugs in holding that an exception 
did not apply). 
 104 See Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1278 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that withholding of certain 
religious objects such as a small quartz crystal did not substantially burden the inmate’s rights to 
practice Odinism), abrogated by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011). 
 105 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2074. For example, the Fifth Circuit found that a policy prohibiting 
group worship with an outside volunteer did not substantially burden a prisoner’s free exercise because 
the policy had “no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs.” Adkins 
v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 569 (2004) (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 
439, 450–51(1988)). 
 106  Nelson, supra note 21, at 2072. In Brown ex rel. Indigenous Inmates at North Dakota State 
Prison v. Schuetzle, the court found the prison’s regulations as a whole “afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise their religious freedoms” and denied a RLUIPA claim regarding the prison’s 
failure to appoint a pipe keeper. 368 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1023 (D.N.D. 2005); see also Patel v. U.S. 
Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that the prison’s provision of vegetarian 
meals mitigated any burden imposed by the prisoner’s inability to have a halal meal). 
 107 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2076–79; see also Smith, 502 F.3d at 1280 (“The Chaplain found . . . 
that the sources that Smith submitted did ‘not show[] the necessity of [a pine] fire’ . . . . Failing such 
evidence, we are unable to find how, if at all, the denial of a pine fire pit effectuated a substantial 
burden on his observance of Odinism.”); Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 506 F.3d 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 
2007) (“Whether or not RLUIPA’s definition includes such a requirement, we have held that it is 
necessary to show that the existence of a sincerely held tenet or belief that is central or fundamental to 
an individual’s religion is a prerequisite to a ‘substantially burdened’ claim under RLUIPA.”). 
 108 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2068. 
 109 Id. at 2080. These courts held either that “testimony from prison administrators is the equivalent 
of empirical proof” or that due deference does not require empirical proof. Id. at 2082–83; see also, e.g., 
Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 939 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[O]fficials charged with managing such a 
volatile environment need [not] present evidence of actual problems to justify security concerns.”); 
Hoevennar v. Lazaroff, 422 F.3d 366, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that the lower court “did not give 
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that could be seen as moving the burden of proof for compelling interest 
from the defendant to the plaintiff.110 Other deferential courts required more 
than a mere assertion but did not go much further because they accepted 
“administrative convenience” as a compelling interest111 or accepted 
arguments that the state has a compelling interest in the “regulatory scheme 
as a whole.”112 For example, the Sixth Circuit gave weight to the warden’s 
opinion that “individualized exemptions are problematic because they 
cause . . . problems with enforcement of the regulations due to staff 
members’ difficulties in determining who is exempted and who is not.”113 
Deferential courts recognized these administrative cost-saving arguments 
even though administrative convenience has not been accepted as 
compelling in other contexts.114 And by considering the regulatory scheme 
as a whole, deferential courts allowed prison officials to avoid proving that 
one accommodation would undermine the overall prison policy.115 
Deferential courts also engaged in a minimal review of potential 
alternatives, did not consider accommodations made in other prisons, and 
ignored inconsistency within a prison when determining whether a policy 
 
proper deference to the opinions of . . . veterans of the prison system” and should have found the 
prison’s restrictions were the least restrictive means based on testimony offered by the warden and 
security specialist). 
 110 See, e.g., Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897, 911 (8th Cir. 2008) (Melloy, J., dissenting). Judge 
Michael Melloy argued that accepting prison officials’ conclusory assertions forced the prisoner to put 
forth data to refute these assertions. Id. Essentially, the burden shifts from the prison officials to the 
prisoner even though RLUIPA puts the burden to establish the policy was the least restrictive means on 
the prison. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2012) (“If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support 
a claim alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc of this title, the 
government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim . . . .”). 
 111 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2084. In Baranowski v. Hart, for example, the Fifth Circuit found that 
the “policy [of denying kosher food] is related to maintaining good order and controlling costs and, as 
such, involves compelling government interests.” 486 F.3d 112, 125 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Fegans, 
537 F.3d at 902–03, 906 (finding there is a compelling interest presented by the “strain on prison 
resources and inmate-staff relations” caused by the increased number of searches that an exception 
would require). 
 112 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2068–69, 2085. In Fegans, for instance, the Eighth Circuit “d[id] not 
interpret RLUIPA to prevent a prison from applying certain important security regulations to all 
inmates without providing for exemptions.” 537 F.3d at 907. 
 113 Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 422 F.3d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Nelson, supra 21, at 2080 
(noting that officials argued that administrative costs were linked with security). 
 114 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973) (finding administrative 
convenience does not pass what has been termed as an immediate scrutiny test—a lower standard than 
the strict scrutiny RLUIPA’s language suggests—applied to claims of sexual discrimination). 
 115 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2068. Nelson additionally notes that such a broad analysis conflicts 
with the “case-by-case” standard the Court applied to analogous RFRA claims. Id. at 2086 n.142 (citing 
as an example Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–31 
(2006)). 
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was the least restrictive means.116 For example, the Eighth Circuit noted 
that “[i]t would be a herculean burden to require prison administrators to 
refute every conceivable option in order to satisfy the least restrictive 
means prong.”117 The court further claimed that “evidence of policies at one 
prison is not conclusive proof that the same policies would work at another 
institution”118 and that comparisons do “not outweigh the deference owed to 
the expert judgment of prison officials who are infinitely more familiar 
with their own institutions than outside observers.”119 Essentially, courts 
that read Cutter to require deference to prison officials have tolerated even 
the weakest arguments for compelling interest and least restrictive means. 
In contrast, the First,120 Third,121 Fourth,122 Seventh,123 and Ninth124 
Circuits have found that prison officials’ rationales deserve a “hard 
look.”125 Though these courts recognized the deference suggested by 
Cutter, some justified a more stringent standard because RLUIPA’s 
legislative history also suggested “inadequately formulated prison 
regulations and policies grounded on mere speculation, exaggerated fears, 
or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice to meet the act’s 
requirements.”126 Other courts relied on RLUIPA’s mandate to “afford [the] 
confined populations greater protection of religious exercise than what the 
 
 116 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2068–69. 
 117 Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 940 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 118 Id. at 941. 
 119 Id. at 942 (emphasis omitted). 
 120 See Spratt v. R.I. Dep’t of Corr., 482 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding an RLUIPA exception 
to a regulation prohibiting inmate preaching without a chaplain because the prison official’s assertion 
was speculative). 
 121 See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 284 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding the prison’s interest in 
safety and health was not furthered by a policy limiting the number of books allowed in a cell because 
the prison allowed magazines and newspapers). 
 122 See Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 190 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that prison officials’ mere 
assertion that a “legitimate interest in removing inmates from religious dietary programs where the 
inmate flouts prison rules reasonably established in order to accommodate the program” did not 
articulate why the interest was compelling without evidence “with respect to the policy’s security or 
budget implications”). 
 123 See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 800 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing how orderly administration 
of a dietary system did not constitute a compelling interest to justify the requirement that a clergy 
member verify that a nonmeat diet was part of a religious belief system). 
 124 See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that the prison 
“utterly failed to demonstrate that the disputed grooming policy is the least restrictive means necessary 
to ensure prison safety and security”). 
 125 James D. Nelson used the term “hard look” when describing the lack of deference shown by 
these courts. See Nelson, supra note 21, at 2054–55. 
 126 See, e.g., Spratt v. R.I. Dep’t of Corr., 482 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting 146 CONG. REC. 
S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch & Kennedy)). 
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Constitution itself affords” as a reason to closely examine the prison 
regulations.127 
Courts that took a hard look at the substantial burden prong examined 
the effect of the discrete policy on the individual.128 These courts also found 
that a prisoner’s rights are substantially burdened when the prisoner is 
pressured into forgoing exercise or faces a “hard choice” between exercise 
and punishment.129 Hard look courts further obeyed RLUIPA’s command to 
not consider the centrality of a religious exercise and even avoided trying 
to determine a prisoner’s sincerity, which is permitted by the statute.130 
Moreover, hard look courts required prison officials to actually 
demonstrate a compelling interest rather than simply assert it.131 For 
example, in Lovelace v. Lee, the Fourth Circuit found the prison’s lack of 
evidence regarding budget implications of an exception to be fatal.132 
Additionally, these courts rejected the legitimacy of a government interest 
when the policies were significantly underinclusive.133 For instance, as 
mentioned above, the Warsoldier court was skeptical about restrictions on 
men’s hair length, ostensibly to prevent hiding of contraband, when 
women’s hair of similar length was not restricted.134 Hard look courts, 
 
 127 See, e.g., Lovelace, 472 F.3d  at 186. 
 128 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2093 (“[This] approach marked a stark departure from pre-RLUIPA 
prisoner case law, where one-time impositions on religion were almost always held to be de minimis, 
even if the deprivation was quite serious.”). 
 129 Id. at 2094–96. For example, in Warsoldier, the Ninth Circuit found that a reduction of benefits 
or application of pressure—even pressure not rising to the level of coercion—on a prisoner imposed a 
substantial burden on that prisoner’s religious exercise. 418 F.3d at 996. And in Washington v. Klem, 
the Third Circuit found a substantial burden exists when “1) a follower is forced to choose between 
following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available . . . OR 2) the 
government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate 
his beliefs.” 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 130 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2096–98; see also, e.g., Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 188 (finding that 
RLUIPA does not permit “blanket assumption[s]” about sincerity because a prisoner may be sincere in 
belief even if he does not adhere to every tenant of the faith). 
 131 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2099–2100; see also, e.g., Klem, 497 F.3d at 283 (“[T]he mere 
assertion of security or health reasons is not, by itself, enough for the Government to satisfy the 
compelling governmental interest requirement.”). 
 132 Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 190; see also, e.g., Spratt v. R.I. Dep’t of Corr., 482 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 
2007) (noting that the government’s case suffered from a lack of research on the effects of past 
experimentation with similar policies). 
 133 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2101. A law is underinclusive if it does not affect others similarly 
situated. Underinclusive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/underinclusive 
[https://perma.cc/LA5L-BVV2]. 
 134  418 F.3d at 1000. 
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moreover, found that administrative convenience was not a compelling 
interest.135 
If a compelling interest was found, hard look courts required that 
prison administrators affirmatively prove that less restrictive alternatives 
did not exist to achieve the compelling interest.136 For example, one court 
required a prison to “demonstrate[] that it ha[d] actually considered and 
rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the 
challenged practice.”137 Courts also looked at similarly situated prisons to 
see if they were able to accommodate similar requests and if these other 
prisons were able to make accommodations, required the prison officials to 
explain sufficiently what makes the prison different such that they could 
not make those accommodations.138 Thus, at each step of the analysis, hard 
look courts questioned the assertions made by prison officials and required 
the presentation of evidence to support the assertions. 
C. Holt v. Hobbs: An Opportunity to Clarify the Law 
The circuit split that followed Cutter presented a significant problem: 
a prisoner incarcerated in a hard look jurisdiction was far more likely to 
obtain a religious accommodation than a prisoner in a deferential 
jurisdiction. So, in 2015, the Court reexamined RIULPA in Holt v. 
Hobbs.139 The issue in Holt was whether an Arkansas Department of 
Corrections (ADOC) policy prohibiting facial hair violated the rights of a 
Muslim prisoner who wished to grow a half-inch beard pursuant to his 
faith.140 This presented an opportunity for the Court to clarify strict scrutiny 
under RLUIPA and the level of deference that should be extended to prison 
officials. But instead of providing clarification, the Court issued a fact-
specific ruling that offered little precision and, in fact, may have increased 
the level of confusion in the lower courts. 
 
 135 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2101–03; see also, e.g., Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 191 (suggesting that 
only “security, safety, or cost considerations” are acceptable compelling interests). 
 136 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2103–05. 
 137 Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 890 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 996); see 
also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 998–1000 (demanding “detailed evidence” of alternatives considered and 
why they were rejected). 
 138 Nelson, supra note 21, at 2105. For example, in Spratt v. Rhode Island Department of 
Corrections, the First Circuit found that “in the absence of any explanation by [the Department of 
Corrections] of significant differences between [this prison] and a federal prison that would render the 
federal policy unworkable, the Federal Bureau of Prisons policy suggests that some form of inmate 
preaching could be permissible without disturbing prison security.” 482 F.3d 33, 42 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 139 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
 140 Id. at 859. 
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In its decision, the Court first examined the substantial burden prong. 
It found that the petitioner met his burden of proving that the no-facial-hair 
policy substantially burdened his religious exercise because “[i]f petitioner 
contravene[d] that policy and gr[ew] his beard, he [would] face serious 
disciplinary action.”141 Essentially, the Court made an individualized 
determination by asking whether the prisoner would be forced to decide 
between violating his beliefs or violating prison policy (and facing 
sanctions). 
Next, the Court addressed the compelling interest prong. It agreed 
with prison officials that the policy furthered the compelling interest of 
security by allowing for “quick and reliable identification of prisoners.”142 
The Court, however, seemed to take a hard look at whether the no-facial-
hair policy was the least restrictive means for furthering that interest: the 
Court maintained that this standard was “exceptionally demanding,” and 
required the government to “sho[w] it lack[ed] other means” to meet its 
objective.143 
In its least restrictive means analysis, the Court said that “RLUIPA 
requires us to ‘scrutinz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific 
exemptions to particular religious claimants’ and ‘to look to the marginal 
interest in enforcing’ the challenged government action in that particular 
context.”144 Additionally, the Court looked for underinclusiveness, finding 
it incongruent to allow hair longer than a half inch but not beards longer 
than a half inch if the purpose of the regulation was to prevent hiding 
contraband.145 The Court also noted that because the prison already 
searched head hair for contraband and allowed quarter-inch beards for 
dermatological reasons, prison officials needed to explain why these 
grooming types could be searched to prevent hiding of contraband but a 
half-inch beard could not be.146 Finally, the Court found that other prisons 
effectively use before-and-after photographs to prevent a situation where 
guards could be confused by a prisoner who shaves his beard and that the 
ADOC did not show that it needed a different policy.147 A unanimous Court 
thus held that the ADOC policy was not the least restrictive means of 
 
 141 Id. at 862. 
 142 Id. at 864. 
 143 Id.  
 144 Id. at 863 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014)). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 864. 
 147 Id. at 865. The Court noted that other prison policies are not controlling but that “when so many 
prisons offer an accommodation, a prison must, at minimum, offer persuasive reasons why it believes 
that it must take a different course.” Id. at 866. 
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ensuring prison security and that an accommodation for Petitioner’s half-
inch beard had to be made.148 
Regarding deference specifically, the Court said that although prison 
officials are experts who should be respected, RLUIPA “does not permit 
such unquestioning deference” because “respect does not justify the 
abdication of the responsibility, conferred by Congress, to apply RLUIPA’s 
rigorous standard.”149 At the same time, however, the Court also suggested 
that “courts should not blind themselves to the fact that the [RLUIPA] 
analysis is conducted in the prison setting” and that RLUIPA “affords 
prison officials ample ability to maintain security.”150 This language 
resembles Cutter’s “context matters” instruction151 and appears to qualify, if 
not contradict, the hard look analysis the Court had just conducted. Indeed, 
the Court failed to cite or discuss Cutter’s due deference language or the 
split it caused in the lower courts. Thus, it appeared that lower courts could 
read Holt and Cutter as still permitting significant deference to prison 
officials, requiring a hard look at a prison’s interests and policies, or 
somewhere in between. In fact, initial scholarship suggested that the 
Court’s failure to discuss Cutter’s due deference standard and its ruling out 
only unquestioning deference served to “outline[] an upper bound” of the 
appropriate level of deference in RLUIPA claims.152 At first glance, the 
Court simply did not sufficiently clarify the matter for lower courts. 
In her concurrence, Justice Sonia Sotomayor attempted to reconcile 
the unanimous majority decision with Cutter’s discussion of “context” and 
“due deference.”153 She asserted that Cutter still stands and that the Holt 
opinion did not preclude courts from giving due deference to prison 
officials who “offer a plausible explanation for their chosen policy that is 
supported by whatever evidence is reasonably available to them.”154 Justice 
Sotomayor indicated that this deference did not extend to prison officials 
who “declare a compelling governmental interest by fiat” or to policies 
grounded upon “mere speculation.”155 Furthermore, she noted that Holt did 
not require prison officials to consider and reject all conceivable 
alternatives that might be a less restrictive means to meet a compelling 
 
 148 Id. at 859. 
 149 Id. at 864. 
 150 Id. at 866. The Court also noted that security could be protected by questioning whether a 
claimant is sincere in his belief and by withdrawing accommodations if abused. Id. at 866–67. 
 151 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 152 See Holt Comment, supra note 33, at 360. 
 153 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 154 135 S. Ct. at 867 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 155 Id. 
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interest.156 Rather, she suggested that a prison only need to respond 
adequately to “less restrictive policies [that] the petitioner identified in the 
course of the litigation.”157 
At first glance, Justice Sotomayor’s reconciliation of Holt and Cutter 
does not provide complete clarity for the lower courts. Her inclusion of 
deferential language could be used to maintain Cutter’s deferential 
standard,158 but the Court’s analysis in Holt appears to have required more 
than a plausible explanation for the grooming policy at issue and more than 
an adequate response to policies suggested by the inmate. It seems 
perfectly plausible that, as ADOC suggested, before-and-after photographs 
could fail to protect prison security because a half-inch beard could conceal 
a prisoner’s facial features and make him unrecognizable if he were to 
shave it, thus allowing him to potentially gain access to restricted areas.159 
But the Court required more: it required an explanation why Arkansas 
could not allow longer beards as other state prisons did.160 
Professor David Shapiro, who considered how these cases can be 
reconciled, suggested that because the majority did not discuss Cutter and 
no other Justice joined Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence attempting to 
reconcile the two decisions, the lower courts should send the Cutter 
decision “to the dustbin of history.”161 Professor Shapiro posited that, 
though overruling by implication is disfavored, “Cutter’s principal holding 
was that RLUIPA did not violate the Establishment Clause”162 and thus 
lower courts could see the Court as simply “ignor[ing] its previous, 
erroneous dictum.”163 Shapiro noted, however, that lower courts may not 
wish to fully implement Holt because doing so would necessarily imply 
that all previous decisions under Cutter were decided under the wrong legal 
standard.164 Thus, Shapiro speculated that Holt’s lack of clarity will allow 
judges inclined to be lenient toward prisoners and religion to find religious 
 
 156 Id. at 868. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See Shapiro, supra note 85, at 128. (“Cloaked as a statement of agreement with the lead 
opinion, the concurrence is in fact an attempt to gut the decision and resurrect Cutter.”). 
 159 See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 865. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Shapiro, supra note 85, at 127; see also David M. Shapiro, Lenient in Theory, Dumb in Fact: 
Prison, Speech, and Scrutiny, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 972, 1024–25 (2016) (“Holt strongly suggests 
that courts should apply RLUIPA with far less deference than the dictum in Cutter had implied.”). As 
Professor Shapiro noted, it is especially striking that the Court completely omitted reference to Cutter, 
considering it was the only prior Supreme Court interpretation of the deference standard. See Shapiro, 
supra note 85, at 127. This omission suggests Cutter might be overruled by implication. Id. at 128. 
 162 Shapiro, supra note 85, at 128. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
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accommodations for prisoners, whereas judges who are unsympathetic to 
prisoners will be deferential to prison officials’ polices.165 
That said, Professor Shapiro suggested that “context still matters” and 
Holt’s analogous instruction that courts should not “blind themselves” to 
the prison setting is the key to understanding the seemingly incongruent 
standard—quite simply, there should be a hard look, but courts should not 
forget that prison restrictions happen in an environment with unique 
security and management concerns.166 But as this Note’s analysis will show, 
there has been a shift, albeit incomplete, toward Holt’s harder look 
standard, and there has been less lower court resistance to Holt than 
Professor Shapiro predicted. 
III. RLUIPA LITIGATION POST-HOLT 
Confusion abounded after Holt.167 Professor Shapiro noted that the 
early results of Holt suggested the Court did not set forth a clear standard: 
some courts saw the standards to be reconcilable, but others ignored Cutter 
deference.168 This Note goes a step further in conducting a comprehensive 
quantitative review of every RLUIPA decision citing Holt for two years 
after it was decided. Overall, this analysis reveals that the lower courts 
have heeded Holt’s instruction to take a harder look, which has tipped the 
balance in favor of prisoners’ rights. However, this trend towards a hard 
look framework has not completely repudiated Cutter deference. 
A. Methodology 
There are 115 cases from January 20, 2015 to January 20, 2017 
adjudicating prisoners’ requests for religious accommodations that reached 
a dispositive stage.169 I analyzed each case to determine the level of 
 
 165 Id. at 129–30. 
 166 Shapiro, supra note 161, at 1025. 
 167 For example, in discussing the RLUIPA analysis post-Holt, Judge William Conley noted, 
“District courts are left to apply a balancing test under RLUIPA. Unfortunately, there has yet to be a 
sufficient number of cases to assess with much confidence how to weigh either side of the scale now 
that RLUIPA has apparently lowered the threshold on both sides.” Tatum v. Meisner, No. 13-CV-44-
WMC, 2016 WL 323682, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 26, 2016). 
 168 Shapiro, supra note 161, at 1028–30. 
 169 This sample of cases was located by searching “Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015)” in 
WestLawNext. Next, the “Citing References” hyperlink was selected, and the search was narrowed to 
“Cases,” and narrowed by “Date” to “Date Range” from 01/20/2015 until 01/20/2017. The sample does 
not include cases that were dismissed for failure to meet the frivolity review required by the Prisoner’s 
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), cases that were disposed of on other bases, or cases where the RLUIPA 
issue was not fully litigated. The PLRA permits a case to be dismissed if the court determines the claim 
is facially frivolous. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2012). It is possible that courts dismiss cases as 
frivolous under the PLRA to either avoid the Holt issue or to reach a decision in the prison’s favor. See 
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deference that was applied to prison officials’ explanations.170 Although a 
few cases declined to even cite Cutter, the vast majority cited both Holt and 
Cutter in explaining the state of the law.171 Thus, my coding focused on 
application—did the courts ask for more from prison officials than mere 
plausible assertions of a compelling interest and that the policy in question 
was considered to be the least restrictive means of meeting that interest? 
An example of deferential reasoning is Rush v. Malin,172 where the court 
relied solely on a prison administrator’s declaration to determine that a 
policy of providing separate services for Sunni and Shi‘a inmates was the 
least restrictive means of meeting safety, security, and cost concerns.173 On 
the other hand, examples of hard look reasoning include questioning 
explanations offered by prison officials,174 looking for underinclusivity,175 
 
Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: The 
Case for Amending the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 142 (arguing that 
the PLRA has prevented prisoners from raising legitimate claims); Corbett H. Williams, Note, 
Evisceration of the First Amendment: The Prison Litigation Reform Act and Interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(e) in Prisoner First Amendment Claims, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 859, 864 (2006) (“[The PLRA] 
has served to stifle not only frivolous litigation, but meritorious constitutional claims as well.”). 
Moreover, these cases are often litigated without the benefit of counsel, which could further impede the 
claim’s ability to meet the frivolity standard. See Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in the Gaps of 
Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 277–84 (2010) (discussing 
barriers pro se prisoners must overcome to research and file a legal claim). Because these decisions 
often do not discuss the RLUIPA standard in any depth, I have excluded them to focus the analysis on 
those that do. 
 170 Admittedly, coding determinations can be more art than science. Additionally, other unseen 
factors, such as bad lawyering, could account for some dispositions. 
 171 See, e.g., Marshall v. Pa. Dep’t. of Corr., No. 3:12-0351, 2015 WL 1224708, at *9 (M.D. Pa. 
Mar. 17, 2015) (citing Cutter’s due deference language while noting that Holt does not allow 
mechanical acceptance of prison administrators’ explanations), aff’d mem., 690 F. App’x 91 (3d Cir. 
2017); Williams v. Leonard, No. 9:11-CV-1158 (TJM/TWD), 2015 WL 3536733, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 19, 2015) (quoting Cutter’s due deference language and qualifying it with Holt’s disallowance of 
unquestioning deference). 
 172 No. 15 CV 3103 (VB), 2016 WL 5793752 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2016). 
 173 Id. at *5 (“Defendants have also satisfied the Court that [the] policies are the least restrictive 
means available . . . as explained in a declaration by [the] Director of Ministerial, Family and Volunteer 
Services . . . .”). 
 174 See, e.g., Ware v. La. Dep’t of Corr., No. 14-2214, 2016 WL 4916844, at *4 (W.D. La. Sept. 
12, 2016) (“It is clear to this Court from the testimony of Warden Goodwin and Colonel Odom that at 
this time there is no correlation between the Rastafarian faith, including the wearing of dreadlocks, and 
any concern surrounding the STGs.”). The district court in Ware found the policy was the least 
restrictive means to achieve the compelling interests of contraband control, offender identification, 
offender hygiene, and inmate-employee safety. Id. at *12. The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed and 
found these justifications were also underinclusive and the policy was not the least restrictive means to 
achieve the Department of Corrections’ compelling interests. Ware v. La. Dep’t of Corr., 866 F.3d 263, 
270–74 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 175 For an example of a court finding an underinclusive policy, consider Harris v. Wall: 
Specifically, RIDOC has failed to present creditable reasons why Plaintiff’s suggestion that the 
wearing of a kufi in the design already offered in RIDOC’s commissary at least while exercising 
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finding inconsistent application of the policy in question176 or that the 
prison officials did not consider the plaintiff’s specific request,177 being 
skeptical of total bans,178 and considering practices in other prisons.179 
Some cases were difficult to categorize, typically because either the 
plaintiff-inmate or defendant-prison officials did not contest the 
 
in the yard is not workable. RIDOC asserts only that a kufi can be tipped or worn sporadically 
as a gang signal and that it would identify Plaintiff as a Muslim. The first justification fails 
because the kufi would create no more risk of gang signaling than that posed by the stocking 
and baseball caps already worn in the yard. 
217 F. Supp. 3d 541, 559 (D.R.I. 2016). 
 176 For an example of a court finding an inconsistent application of the regulation, see Aiello v. 
West: 
At least so far, defendants have also failed to meet their burden of showing that a general ban on 
inmate-led services is the least restrictive means of addressing that risk. In particular, defendants 
do not dispute that Aiello and a group of two to four other Jewish inmates had, without incident, 
been permitted in the past to lead their own services in the resource room with staff from the 
chapel watching and listening from a nearby officer’s station. Nor do defendants explain why 
Aiello had been permitted to meet with other inmates without a supervisor leading the meetings, 
nor why this previous method of permitting inmates to congregate in small groups in the 
resource room is no longer feasible. 
207 F. Supp. 3d 886, 896 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (emphasis omitted). 
 177 For an example of prison officials not considering the plaintiff-inmate’s suggested alternative 
means, consider Schlemm v. Wall: 
Even so, these concerns do not justify the policies that prohibit vetted and approved spiritual 
advisors or other volunteers from bringing in a sufficient amount of traditional foods—game 
meat with fried bread in particular—for all Ghost Feast attendees. For legitimate security and 
administrative reasons, the DAI may obviously limit the number and quantity of supplies 
brought into the prison by a spiritual advisor, even one sufficiently vetted to limit the potential 
security risks, but that is not what plaintiff requires. 
No. 11-CV-272-WMC, 2016 WL 6603269, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 8, 2016). 
 178 For an example of a court questioning a total ban of a religious grooming standard, item, or 
practice, see Davis v. Davis: 
In the district court, TDCJ presented photographs of objects small enough in size to 
hypothetically be hidden in a kouplock, and evidence that inmates at other institutions hide 
contraband in various styles of short and long hair, indicating that the grooming policy does 
further an interest in preventing the transfer of contraband. But TDCJ has not demonstrated on 
the present record that a total ban on the growing of kouplocks, even as to low security risk 
inmates such as Plaintiffs, is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 
826 F.3d 258, 272 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 179 For an example of a court looking at other prison’s practices, see United States v. Secretary of 
Florida Department of Corrections: 
The Secretary argues that denying a kosher diet statewide is the least restrictive means of 
furthering Florida’s interest in cost containment, but she fails to rebut three arguments to the 
contrary. First, she fails to explain why the Department cannot offer kosher meals when the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons and other states do so. When so many prisons offer an 
accommodation, a prison must, at a minimum, offer persuasive reasons why it believes that it 
must take a different course . . . . 
828 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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determination.180 These cases were coded as “mixed.” Additionally, several 
cases became moot at the disposition stage. Usually, these cases involved 
grooming policies that were changed in light of Holt’s allowance of half-
inch beards,181 the prison ended up making the specific accommodation 
voluntarily,182 or a prisoner that had since been transferred from the 
facility.183 Finally, and significantly, many courts found the policy at issue 
did not pose a substantial burden and did not reach a decision on 
compelling interests and least restrictive means—the stage at which prison 
explanations are most pertinent.184 These cases were coded separately. 
Beyond this coding, I also examined whether an accommodation was 
made. In many cases, it appears the parties settled following a defendant-
prison’s failure to dismiss a prisoner’s litigation.185 In these instances, I 
coded the court’s disposition as an accommodation for the plaintiff, or vice 
versa if the last decision was against the plaintiff. In several cases, the 
plaintiff asked for more than one type of accommodation—for example, 
asking for a dietary accommodation and certain religious items such as 
 
 180 For example, in Casey v. Stephens, the plaintiff-inmate did not contest the prison official’s 
determination of least restrictive means. 
Defendant . . . has offered unrefuted summary judgment evidence that . . . banning personal and 
communal pipes while allowing a contract chaplain to smoke the ceremonial pipe and to offer 
the prayers on behalf of the Native American offenders in attendance is the least restrictive 
means of conducting the sacred pipe ceremonies . . . . 
161 F. Supp. 3d 496, 511 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (emphasis added). On the other hand, in Walker v. Scott, the 
defendant-prison officials did not argue that a compelling interest was served by the policy at issue: 
Defendants, however, have presented no argument or evidence regarding a compelling 
government interest the policy seeks to advance, much less that the denial of a Halal diet was 
the least restrictive means of doing so. Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendants have 
failed to meet their burdens . . . . 
No. 13-3153, 2015 WL 5450497, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2015). 
 181 See, e.g., Deaton v. May, No. 2:13CV00136-KGB-JTK, 2015 WL 9999233, at *2 (E.D. Ark. 
July 24, 2015) (Kearney, Mag. J.) (noting the prison changed its grooming policy to comply with Holt’s 
instruction that half-inch-long beards be permitted), adopted by No. 2:13CV00136-KGB-JTK, 
2016 WL 447608 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 4, 2016); Kelley v. Hobbs, No. 2:13CV00169 BSM-JTK, 2015 WL 
3633721, at *4 (E.D. Ark. June 10, 2015) (same). 
 182 See, e.g., Parkell v. Senato, No. 14-446-SLR, 2016 WL 4059640, at *5 (D. Del. July 26, 2016) 
(dismissing the RLUIPA claim as moot because the plaintiff received the relief he asked for—kosher 
meals), aff’d in part, 704 F. App’x 122 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 183 See, e.g., Gamble v. Kenworthy, 5:12-CT-3053-F, 2015 WL 631329, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 12, 
2015), aff’d, 604 F. App’x 301 (4th Cir. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim as moot because 
the plaintiff was no longer at the prison where the regulation allegedly infringed upon his free exercise). 
 184 See infra notes 200, 203, 205-206 and accompanying text. 
 185 For example, consider West v. Grams, in which the case history ends after the Seventh Circuit 
determined the RLUIPA claim was not moot. 607 F. App’x 561 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Boyd v. 
Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:15-CV-082 RM, 2016 WL 1089850, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 
2016) (explaining how Plaintiff, who settled his previous RLUIPA claim a year prior, argued that the 
prison did not live up the conditions of the settlement). 
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prayer oils in the same suit.186 Each type of accommodation was considered 
separately to determine if certain types of accommodations were more 
frequently granted than others; therefore, there are more data on 
accommodations than on cases. Additionally, cases that were moot because 
the accommodation had already been granted were categorized as 
accommodations, and cases that were moot because the prisoner had 
transferred or another reason not involving an accommodation were 
categorized as no accommodation. 
I also tabulated the stage at which each accommodation was granted 
or denied. For example, courts finding for a plaintiff-inmate did so because 
there was no compelling interest187 or the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling interest was not used or considered.188 Likewise, 
courts generally ruled for a defendant-prison by either determining that 
there was no substantial burden placed on the inmate’s religious activity189 
 
 186 See, e.g., LaPlante v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 89 F. Supp. 3d 235, 253 (D. Mass. 2015). 
 187 For an example of a court finding for the plaintiff because there was no compelling interest in 
the regulation, consider United States v. Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections: 
At the summary judgment hearing, the United States maintained that, while the costs involved 
in providing kosher meals are substantial, Defendants have not shown that they have a 
compelling state interest in containing these particular costs because: (1) Defendants are already 
providing kosher meals and incurring the associated costs; (2) Defendants have not shown that 
the Florida prison system is different from the majority of state prison systems and the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, which are all able to offer kosher meals to prisoners; and (3) Defendants 
have not demonstrated that avoiding these costs actually furthers a compelling state interest . . . . 
[T]he Court agrees with the United States . . . . 
No. 12-22958-CIV, 2015 WL 1977795, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2015) (footnote omitted). 
See also, e.g., Hughes v. Heimgartner, No. 5:12-CV-3250-JAR, 2015 WL 1292253, at *9–12 (D. Kan. 
Mar. 23, 2015) (finding that the cost of permitting inmates to celebrate a religious holiday was not 
compelling); Hodges v. Brown, No. 5:11-CT-3242-D, 2015 WL 736077, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 
2015) (finding that the prison did not present a compelling government interest regarding security 
because the group services policy was applied inconsistently). 
 188 See, e.g., Utt v. Brown, No. 5:12-CT-3132-FL, 2015 WL 5714885, at *11–12 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 
29, 2015) (finding that the prison failed to consider other alternatives for preventing the Wiccan inmates 
from using food in religious celebrations or for the denial of group worship due the lack of an outside 
volunteer, such as permitting the services with a correctional officer present). 
 189 See, e.g., Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 525–26 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that the prisoner 
was not substantially burdened because he did not have to choose between violating his beliefs and 
punishment); Berger v. Burl, No. 5:15-CV-262-JM-BD, 2016 WL 4445771, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 5, 
2016) (Deere, Mag. J.) (finding that the grooming policy did not substantially burden the inmate 
because, as an atheist who claimed that he “ha[d] no religious beliefs,” the inmate did not actually hold 
a sincere religious belief), adopted by No. 5:15-CV-262-JM-BD, 2016 WL 4445248, at *1 (E.D. Ark. 
Aug. 22, 2016); Vazquez v. Maccone, No. 12-CV-4564 (JMA), 2016 WL 2636256, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 6, 2016) (“Petitioner’s inability to kneel on the floor to silently pray—while temporarily held in 
the squad room for arrest processing—does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation but was, at 
most, a de minimis burden.”); Muhammad v. Commonwealth, No. 7:14CV00529, 2016 WL 1068019, at 
*9–10 (W.D. Va. Feb. 1, 2016) (Hoppe, Mag. J.) (finding no substantial burden on the prisoner’s 
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or that the least restrictive means were used to further a compelling interest 
or were at least considered.190 Summary results are presented in Section 
III.B. 
B. The Numbers: Type of Analysis Used by the Courts 
 There are three immediate conclusions from the data regarding the 
type of analysis used by lower courts: (1) most cases were disposed of by 
determining the regulation in question did not pose a substantial burden to 
the exercise of a sincere religious belief; (2) the courts that did reach the 
question of compelling interest and least restrictive alternative were more 
inclined to follow a hard look analysis post-Holt; and (3) there is still some 
inconsistency between the circuits, and surprisingly, some circuits seem to 
have become more deferential post-Holt.191 
 
Table 1: Results (Aggregate) 
Type Number Percentage 
Hard Look 30 26.09% 
Deferential 8 6.96% 
No Substantial Burden 54 46.96% 
Mixed 7 6.09% 
Moot/Other 16 13.91% 





exercise because he did not indicate that the feast meals were inadequate), adopted by No. 
7:14CV00529, 2016 WL 1072092, at *1 (W.D. Va. Mar. 17, 2016). 
 190 See, e.g., McLenithan v. Williams, No. 3:09-CV-00085-AC, 2016 WL 1312314, at *5 (D. Ore. 
Apr. 4, 2016) (Acosta, Mag. J.) (finding and ordering to the effect that restricting Kosher meal access to 
Jewish inmates was the least restrictive means of accommodating individuals with those beliefs without 
incurring a prohibitive cost), appeal filed, No. 16035376 (9th Cir. May 4, 2016); Tucker v. Livingston, 
No. 6:14CV659, 2015 WL 6560538, at *7–8 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2015) (holding that the policy banning 
the NOGE groups was permissible because the group’s racist beliefs posed a threat to a compelling 
interest, security, and that a complete ban was the least restrictive means of ensuring security due to the 
group’s status as a security threat group in many states), appeal filed sub nom. Tucker v. Colier, No. 15-
41643 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 2015). But see Lawson v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:04-CV-00105-MP-GRJ, 
2015 WL 9906259, at *12 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2015) (Jones, Mag. J.) (noting that prison did not 
consider methods used by other prisons that allowed the use of a Sukkah lodge for religious 
ceremonies), adopted by 4:04-CV-00105-MP-GRJ, 2015 WL 2997710, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2016). 
 191 For example, the Fourth Circuit generally applied a hard look type analysis pre-Holt, see supra 
notes 122, 125, 127, 130, 133, 135 and accompanying text, and yet Fourth Circuit courts were the most 
deferential post-Holt once they passed the substantial burden question, see supra Table 2. 
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1st 6 85.7 0 0.0 1 14.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 
2nd 1 33.3 1 33.3 1 33.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 
3rd 2 22.2 0 0.0 5 55.6 1 11.1 1 11.1 9 
4th 2 9.1 4 18.2 13 59.1 0 0.0 3 13.6 22 
5th 4 44.4 0 0.0 
 
0.0 2 22.2 3 33.3 9 
6th 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 
7th 6 42.9 1 7.1 1 7.1 4 28.6 2 14.3 14 
8th  1 11.1 0 0.0 4 44.4 0 0.00 4 44.4 9 
9th 1 6.7 2 13.3 10 66.7 0 0.00 2 13.3 15 
10th  1 33.3 0 0.0 2 66.7 0 0.00 0 0.0 3 
11th  6 40.0 0 0.0 8 53.3 0 0.00 1 6.7    15 
DC 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.0 0 
Total 30 26.1 8 7.0 54 47.0 7 6.1 16 13.9 115 
 
Table 3: Justifications for Finding for Defendant–Prison 
Type Number Percentage 
No Substantial Burden 71 73.20% 
Least Restrictive Means Used 21 21.65% 
Moot 4 4.12% 
Other 1 1.03% 
Total 97 100% 
 
Table 4: Justifications for Finding for Plaintiff–Inmate 
Type Number Percentage 
No Compelling Interest 14 25.45% 
Least Restrictive Means Not Used/Considered 27 49.09% 
Moot 13 23.64% 
Other 1 1.82% 
Total 55 100% 
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1. Many Cases Do Not Find a Substantial Burden and Do Not Need 
to Determine the Level of Deference Due to Prison Officials 
To begin, 60.8% of all cases examined did not consider whether 
courts should afford deference to prison officials’ policy determinations or 
whether courts should take a harder look when determining whether the 
policy was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest. 
Sixteen of the cases were deemed moot or disposed of for other reasons, 
leaving just fifty-four cases that determined the policy did not substantially 
burden the plaintiff-inmate’s exercise of a sincere religious belief. This is 
striking, especially because a pre-Cutter study of RLUIPA found that most 
cases succeeded in establishing substantial burden.192 While conclusions are 
somewhat limited because there is no post-Cutter quantitative study of 
dispositions pre-Holt, this data suggests three possibilities, which are 
outlined below. 
a.  Substantial burden analysis might be an avoidance tool 
The first possibility is that courts may be using a stringent substantial 
burden standard to avoid the deference question because courts have 
institutional limitations that can hinder their ability to apply strict scrutiny 
in a prison context.193 Courts lack investigatory power beyond the parties’ 
testimony and briefs and thus are unable to independently adduce the 
legislative facts that are crucial to understanding issues faced in penal 
institutions.194 Though adversarial proceedings are seen as an effective 
method of arriving at the truth,195 prisoners often file pro se and often lack 
the resources and legal knowledge needed to represent their arguments 
effectively.196 Thus, in some instances, courts may not have the information 
needed to apply strict scrutiny and might prefer to dodge the question. 
 
 192 See Gaubatz, supra note 25, at 569–72. 
 193 As Justice Antonin Scalia noted in his dissent in Brown v. Plata, courts “are ill equipped to deal 
with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform” because “[r]unning a prison 
is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of 
resources.” 536 U.S. 493, 559 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–
85 (1987)). 
 194 Toch & Acker, supra note 64 (“Understanding the prerequisites for the safe and effective 
operation of prisons largely depends on the more transcendent types of information common to 
legislative facts. The courts consequently are challenged to somehow gain entry into the insulated world 
of prison administration.”). 
 195 See Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 
301, 316–17 (1989) (“When each side presents its best case, the decisionmaker has all the information 
he needs to reach a just result.”). But cf. Toch & Acker, supra note 64 (suggesting that “information 
presented in briefs circumvents adversarial testing” and thus can be “inaccurate, incomplete, or 
misleading”). 
 196 See Robbins, supra note 169, at 275–76 (“[M]ost pro se litigants also lack the resources and 
expertise necessary to succeed in their claims.”). 
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Furthermore, separation of powers concerns may encourage courts to 
avoid applying strict scrutiny:197 as the Turner Court noted, prison 
administration is “a task that has been committed to the responsibility of 
[the legislative and executive] branches, and separation of powers concerns 
counsel a policy of judicial restraint.”198 Although these rationales and the 
prevalence of substantial burden dispositions found in this study might 
support the suggestion that courts use the substantial burden test in order to 
avoid the challenges of applying strict scrutiny, not a single opinion 
examined explicitly expressed these concerns or this strategy. 
b. Substantial burden analysis might be a substitute for 
deference 
Second, courts may be using the substantial burden analysis as a 
substitute for the deference normally applied at the compelling interest 
stage so that prison officials have leeway to conduct operations as they see 
fit. In fact, Holt suggested that prison officials can use a determination of 
whether a prisoner’s religiosity is authentic to ensure prison security “if an 
institution suspects that an inmate is using religious activity to cloak illicit 
conduct.”199 Though courts have found lack of substantial burden in various 
instances,200 as of yet, no court has relied on this passage to rule against an 
inmate. 
If courts are using substantial burden analysis to give prison officials 
latitude, one might expect that previously deferential circuits would find 
there was no substantial burden in a high percentage of post-Holt cases. 
The data show this happened in one circuit: the Sixth Circuit, deferential 
pre-Holt, did find there was no substantial burden in all nine cases post-
Holt. Outside of the Sixth Circuit, however, data fail to support the 
hypothesis—for example, both the Ninth Circuit and Fourth Circuit were 
categorized as hard look circuits pre-Holt,201 and both found that there was 
no substantial burden in most of their cases post-Holt. One possible answer 
for this discrepancy is that courts are simply taking a hard look at both 
sides of the equation—the plaintiff’s burdens and the prison’s burdens.202 
 
 197 Sidhu, supra note 23, at 940–41. 
 198 Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. 
 199 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 866–67 (2015). 
 200 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 201 See supra notes 122–138 and accompanying text. 
 202 For example, in Blake v. Rubenstein, the court found that an affidavit claiming food must be 
prepared by a member of the Hare Krishna religion did not outweigh other exhibits that indicated a 
different food preparation procedure. No. 2:08-0906, 2016 WL 5660355, at *18–19 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 
5, 2016) (Aboulhson, Mag. J.), adopted by No. 2:08-0906, 2016 WL 5661233, at *1–2 (S.D. W. Va. 
Sept. 28, 2016). 
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Therefore, it is only reasonable to suggest that courts in the Sixth Circuit 
may be using substantial burden analysis as a substitute for deference. 
c. Substantial burden analysis might eliminate pretextual 
complaints 
Finally, the large amount of no substantial burden adjudications could 
be the result of Holt clarifying the substantial burden test and the fact that 
some inmates use religious claims as a pretext for a desired outcome.203 
Holt was clear that the substantial burden analysis considered the prisoner’s 
subjective religious beliefs, the specific exercise in question, and whether 
the prisoner had to choose between disciplinary action and not following 
his or her subjective beliefs.204 Indeed, several of the courts applied this 
exact analysis and found that the regulation in question did not pose a 
substantial burden.205 This test is somewhat of a meld of the methods used 
by the hard look and deferential courts—although there is an individualized 
determination of plaintiffs’ subjective beliefs (an easier hurdle), plaintiffs 
also need to show more than mere pressure to not follow their beliefs (a 
harder hurdle). Thus, perhaps the higher level of substantial burden 
dispositions reflects that lower courts are doing the job required by Holt 
and getting rid of pretextual claims. 
2. Cases That Consider Compelling Interest and Least Restrictive 
Means Are More Inclined to Follow a Hard Look Analysis Post-
Holt 
Courts that did find a regulation substantially burdened a prisoner’s 
religious exercise next considered the deference question post-Holt. If the 
lower courts followed Professor Shapiro’s suggestion that Holt could be 
 
 203 See, e.g., Arendas v. Lewis, No. 16-CV-00256-GPG, 2016 WL 6962878, at *5 (D. Colo. Nov. 
29, 2016) (Gallagher, Mag. J.) (“[U]nder these circumstances the targeted nature of the claim, which 
appears to be a cleverly faceted attempt to only avoid wearing an identity bracelet but which is not 
aimed at other requirements such as his jail uniform, is in no way supported by sufficient statements 
which state a sincere religious belief.”); Peters v. Clarke, No. 7:14CV00598, 2015 WL 5042917, at *7 
(W.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2015) (“Peters also does not explain how his own desire to meet regularly with 
other Rastafarians is rooted in any particular or sincere religious belief, rather than in some nonreligious 
pursuit, such as a desire to socialize and discuss politics or other secular ideas.”). 
 204 See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862. 
 205 See, e.g., Floyd v. Williams, No. 6:15-CV-103, 2016 WL 7477765, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 
2016) (Baker, Mag. J.) (noting that the defendant did not entirely prevent the inmate from attending the 
religious feast or force the defendant to decide to either attend or face punishment); Adams v. Woodall, 
No. 3:14-CV-00020, 2015 WL 998324, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2015) (Brown, Mag. J.) (finding that 
while one prayer oil vendor was more expensive than another, that did not place unreasonable pressure 
on the plaintiff to forgo his religious beliefs, and finding that the plaintiff did not have a substantial 
burden placed on his religious belief when he had kosher and alternative meals even though the plaintiff 
did not have confidence in the Halal menu), adopted by No. 3:14-CV-00020, 2015 WL 1549002, at *1 
(M.D. Tenn. Apr. 7, 2015). 
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viewed as sending Cutter’s due deference instruction to the dustbin of 
history,206 one would expect to find the lower courts conducting a hard 
look-type investigation once the analysis advances to the compelling 
interest and least restrictive alternative stages. The data shows that courts 
have indeed been inclined to take a harder look post-Holt, with the majority 
of cases either succeeding or failing when least restrictive means were 
considered.207 
Of the forty-five cases that reached this stage of the RLUIPA inquiry, 
67% took a hard look at the interests offered by the defendant and the 
different means that could be used to meet that interest. An additional 16% 
of cases could be characterized as mixed—these cases refused to accept the 
prisons’ mere assertions of a compelling interest and least restrictive means 
because the officials did not respond to potential alternatives posited by the 
plaintiff.208 Only eight cases, or 17%, could be described as deferential to 
prison officials’ explanations.209 
3. Post-Holt, Circuit Courts Still Do Not Give Prison Officials a 
Uniform Level of Deference 
Though as a whole it appears that Holt has tipped the scales to a 
harder look, the opinion’s language and failure to directly repudiate or 
distinguish Cutter has led to some confusion at the circuit level. Post-Holt, 
six circuits have exclusively followed the hard look framework—the First, 
Third, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. The Eleventh and Fifth 
Circuits bear special mention because they had previously been considered 
more deferential.210 Though an accommodation was not granted in the 
controlling Eleventh Circuit case post-Holt, Knight v. Thompson,211 the 
court followed the hard look framework by requiring the prison to prove 
that denying the plaintiff’s specific exemption was the least restrictive 
 
 206 See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text. 
 207 Adjudication based on the least restrictive means test is unsurprising because Holt focused on 
this stage of the analysis and accepted security as a compelling interest. See 135 S. Ct. at 863. 
 208 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 209 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. A court clearly defers to a prison official’s 
explanation when it explicitly relies on the testimony or declaration of an official without much 
discussion of other evidence presented by the plaintiff when determining an accommodation should not 
be granted. For example, in Walker v. Beard, the Ninth Circuit did not examine all possible alternatives 
to the regulation and found that the prison carried its burden by asserting it considered the only 
alternative proposed by the plaintiff and determined it to be race biased. 789 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 
2015). But see United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(taking a hard look at other prisons’ policies to determine if there were alternatives to the regulation at 
issue). 
 210 See supra notes 101, 104 and accompanying text. 
 211 796 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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means.212 It noted that unlike in Holt, where the prison officials relied on 
bare assertions and could not point to an instance where contraband could 
be hidden in a half-inch beard, the officials in Knight established a lengthy 
record that long hair could present a security problem through both prison 
official and unaffiliated testimony.213 And in Wilkinson v. Secretary, 
Florida Department of Corrections,214 the Eleventh Circuit applied the 
same standard and was unconvinced by the prison officials’ bare assertions 
that denial of a fasting holiday was the least restrictive means of promoting 
security.215 
The outlier may be the Fourth Circuit, which was deemed a hard look 
circuit pre-Holt.216 Of its twenty-two cases post-Holt, the Circuit applied a 
hard look analysis only twice and was deferential four times. The rest of 
the cases were disposed of for lack of substantial burden or mootness. In 
the cases where lower courts in the Fourth Circuit applied deference, they 
noted that defendants are required to “acknowledge and give some 
consideration to least restrictive alternatives.”217 This language mirrors 
(without citing) Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, in which she suggested 
that prison officials only need to respond to least restrictive alternatives 
brought to their attention by prisoners.218 Thus, it appears the Fourth Circuit 
has interpreted Holt’s no “unquestioning deference” prohibition to demand 
some level of deference. For example, in Snodgrass v. Robinson, a district 
court in the Fourth Circuit found that the prison failed its burden because it 
put forth a single affidavit stating that it had considered other alternatives 
to the religious celebration policy in question.219 
 
*          *          * 
 
At bottom, this data shows three trends. First, for various potential 
reasons, most cases are dismissed for want of substantial burden. Second, 
Holt does appear to have led to a more stringent review in those cases that 
do past the substantial burden stage. Third, despite this, there still is some 
confusion as to the proper standard in the lower courts. This Note next 
 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. at 1292–93. 
 214 622 F. App’x 805 (11th Cir. 2015) (unpublished). 
 215 Id. at 815 (“Indeed, Chaplain Ojukwu has failed to show, as he must, ‘that [SBCF’s religious 
services] lack[] other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the 
exercise of religion’ by Mr. Wilkinson.” (quoting Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 864 (2015))). 
 216 See supra notes 122, 125, 127, 130, 133, 135 and accompanying text. 
 217 See Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 218 See supra notes 153–157 and accompanying text. 
 219 No. 7:14CV00259, 2015 WL 4743986, at *10–12 (W.D. Va. Aug. 10, 2015). 
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considers whether, in light of these trends, Holt has led to an increase in 
granted accommodations under RLUIPA. 
C. The Numbers: Accommodation Success Post-Holt  
 Moving beyond analysis type, there was a relatively high success rate 
for prisoners seeking accommodations under RLUIPA post-Holt: 27.63% 
of requested accommodations were granted.220 By contrast, between 1993 
and 1998, only 10% of RFRA claims under similar statutory language 
succeeded.221 Additionally, there were thirteen moot cases where the prison 
voluntarily made the accommodation. Thus, courts have perhaps been more 
amenable to prisoners’ religious rights. The Seventh and First Circuits have 
proven to be the most accommodating: each found for the inmate over 75% 
of the time. Both circuits employed a hard look framework, showing there 
is some correlation between courts applying a more stringent RLUIPA 
standard and success on the merits. 
 
Table 5: Success Rate 
Type Number Percentage 
Accommodation 42 27.63% 
No Accommodation 93 61.18% 
Moot (Accommodation) 13 8.55% 
Moot (No Accommodation) 4 2.63% 
Total 152 100% 
 
This quantitative analysis demonstrates that Holt has had a significant 
effect. When courts did reach the compelling interest and least restrictive 
means tests, they generally applied a hard look analysis. These courts gave 
less deference to prison officials, asking them to explain their policies 
adequately and questioning these explanations. This shift led to an increase 
in accommodations for prisoners’ religious exercise. These findings, 
however, are qualified because most cases were still disposed of without 
accommodation due to lack of substantial burden. Though there is no 
unequivocal explanation for courts’ focus on substantial burden, one 
reasonable conclusion is that in light of Holt’s clarification of substantial 
burden, lower courts are scrutinizing inmate burdens just as closely as 
prison official burdens to determine whether a prisoner’s exercise is 
 
 220 More accommodations were found involving beards and grooming policies than any other type 
of accommodation—not surprising, considering that Holt involved a grooming policy. 
 221 See Lupu, supra note 34, at 607–17. 
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burdened or the asserted burden is just a pretext to gain a certain 
accommodation. And although these are clear trends, there is still some 
confusion in both result and method within the circuits. 
 
Table 6: Success Rate: Circuit 
Circuit Accommodations % No Accommodation % Total Cases 
First 11 78.57% 3 21.43% 14 
Second 2 40.00% 3 60.00% 5 
Third 4 33.33% 8 66.67% 12 
Fourth 5 15.63% 27 84.38% 32 
Fifth 6 54.55% 5 45.45% 11 
Sixth 0 0.00% 13 100.00% 13 
Seventh 12 75.00% 4 25.00% 16 
Eight 5 55.56% 4 44.44% 9 
Ninth 2 10.53% 17 89.47% 19 
Tenth 1 33.33% 2 66.67% 3 
Eleventh 7 38.89% 11 61.11% 18 
DC 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 
Total 55 36.18% 97 63.82% 152 
D. Understanding Holt and Cutter Moving Forward 
So did Holt overrule Cutter? Some courts that have expressly 
addressed the question claim Holt merely has refined the law.222 Indeed, 
most cite both standards while reaching their decision.223 Further, the 
Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in Knight v. 
Thompson,224 a deferential Eleventh Circuit case that explicitly discussed 
how Holt did not change the outcome of its pre-Holt Knight I decision, 
which applied the Cutter standard.225 Though denial of a petition is not 
dispositive, if the Court wished to clarify any confusion post-Holt and 
explicitly overrule Cutter deference, it could have done so. The Court did 
 
 222 See, e.g., Sareini v. Burnett, No. 08-CV-13961, 2017 WL 85766, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 
2017) (“The Court does not believe that Holt constitutes a significant change in law sufficient to justify 
vacating the previous judgment. Holt may have refined or altered the analysis under RLUIPA, but it did 
not dramatically change the analytical framework.”). 
 223 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 224 136 S. Ct. 1824–25 (2016), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 2534 (2016). For the Eleventh Circuit’s 
original opinion, see Knight v. Thompson, 796 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 225 See 723 F.3d 1275, 1276–77 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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not, and as the results of this study suggest, Cutter is still alive in some 
form. 
If both Cutter’s and Holt’s instructions about deference still apply, 
how should a court ideally balance the two? The answer lies in the 
majority’s language in Holt: The Court disavowed “unquestioning 
deference” while clarifying that the “test requires the Department not 
merely to explain why it denied the exemption but to prove that denying 
the exemption is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling 
governmental interest.”226 In other words, courts should not simply accept a 
prison official’s assertions without examining additional proof, such as 
other expert testimony, evidence of alternative regulations’ effectiveness, 
or evidence of underinclusiveness. 
Accordingly, many lower courts have recognized Justice Sotomayor’s 
suggestion that officials need not prove that every conceivable option is not 
the least restrictive means but merely need to consider that the options 
presented by the petitioner when asking for an accommodation.227 A court 
cannot consider every conceivable alternative, but these courts are right to 
generally require proof to be presented that the plaintiff’s suggested 
alternatives did not meet the compelling interest. As outlined above,228 
courts should ask for more than Justice Sotomayor’s plausible explanation 
for why the alternative did not meet the compelling interest in that specific 
instance. Though the Holt majority did not measure the quantum of proof 
required, one court has suggested a sufficiency standard, rather than a more 
stringent standard like “beyond a reasonable doubt.”229 
Sufficiency makes sense—requiring a sufficiency standard does give 
courts leeway to consider prison officials’ legitimate need for order and 
security as suggested in Cutter230 and as elaborated by Professor Shapiro.231 
A mere explanation of the rationale behind a regulation that burdens a 
prisoner’s exercise should not be enough because deferring to such 
explanations without more is clearly “unquestioning” deference. Cutter’s 
requirement of some deference to prison officials’ determination, however, 
remains intact under this standard. This, then, may be the best path to 
reconciling Cutter and Holt. 
 
 226 135 S. Ct. 853, 858, 864 (2015) (emphasis added). 
 227 Id. at 868 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 228 See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text. 
 229 See, e.g., Aurel v. Kammuaf, No. ELH-15-1581, 2016 WL 3418818 at *8 (D. Md. June 22, 
2016) (“Rather, due deference will be afforded to those explanations that sufficiently ‘take[] into 
account any institutional need to maintain good order, security, and discipline.’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2012))). 
 230 See supra notes 153–157 and accompanying text. 
 231 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Holt helped clarify the conflict 
between Cutter’s due deference instruction and RLUIPA’s traditional strict 
scrutiny language. As a result, the First, Third, Fifth, Eight, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have now adopted a hard look framework when 
determining RLUIPA claims instead of simply deferring to prison officials’ 
recognitions. Post-Holt, courts simply deferred to prison officials’ 
determinations in only eight of the forty-five cases that considered prison 
explanations when examining compelling interest and least restrictive 
means. Thus, once a prisoner shows that a prison regulation substantially 
burdens her religious exercise, it is more likely that the court will order an 
accommodation be made after applying a higher level of scrutiny to the 
regulation at issue. Holt has therefore nudged the RLUIPA standard away 
from “strict in theory, deferential in fact” and closer to “strict in theory, 
strict in fact.” 
This picture, however, is not complete. A significant number of cases 
did not consider the level of deference due to prison officials because the 
courts found the regulation did not substantially burden the prisoner’s 
religious exercise. There are three possible reasons for this: (1) courts use a 
substantial burden analysis to avoid determining the level of deference due 
to prison officials post-Holt; (2) courts use substantial burden analysis as a 
substitute for deference in order to give prison officials latitude to maintain 
prison control; and (3) Holt clarified the substantial burden test by focusing 
on the individual’s subjective beliefs, and some inmates are simply using 
religion as a pretext for an accommodation. Further, even though more 
courts are taking a harder look at prison officials’ determinations when 
examining RLUIPA claims, some circuits—such as the Fourth Circuit—
still defer to such determinations. Therefore, Holt did not completely solve 
the deference question, and some uncertainty remains in the lower courts. 
It is possible reconcile Cutter’s “due deference” language with Holt’s 
no “unquestioning deference” instruction. The Holt Court explained the 
upper bounds of deference that can be accorded to prison officials’ 
determinations: Instead of receiving “unquestioning deference,” a prison 
must sufficiently prove to the court that the burdening policy is in fact the 
least restrictive means presented to meet a compelling interest. So, rather 
than simply accepting prison officials’ assertions as true, courts should 
consider additional proof such as other expert testimony, evidence of 
underinclusiveness (or lack thereof), evidence of efficacy (or lack thereof), 
and evidence of other prisons’ policies. This sufficiency standard allows 
courts to recognize the unique aspects of security and order within the 
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penal system while still critically examining infringements upon prisoners’ 
RLUIPA-protected religious exercise. 
 
